Another Political Science Game-Changer

 26-08-04: Upon browsing the 320.9 section of the downtown library, I encountered this title.

If We Can Keep It: How the Republic Collapsed and How it Might be Saved

Michael Tomasky

Either Mr. Tomasky or his publishing agent is a serious narcissist

A game-changing account of the deep roots of political polarization in America and, finally a fourteen-point agenda for how to fix it.

That is how the cover jacket introduces the blurbs. I only recognize two of the five distinguished reviewers: Jeffrey Toobin and Joy Reid. Upon review of the first sentence, I realized Mr. Tomasky is an unrepentant libtard. "The Constitutional Convention passes the Connecticut Compromise by a vote, 5-4-1, creating the inherently unrepresentative United States Senate." 

Only Libtards describe the Senate as something other than what it is supposed to be. I cannot believe Mr. Tomasky does not understand that the Senate is supposed to represent the states. The erroneous Seventeenth Amendment diverted the noble intention. The Amazon site for the book changes the blurb introduction.

A game-changing account of the deep roots of political polarization in America, including an audacious fourteen-point agenda for how to fix it.

It appears that the powers that be explained to Mr. Tomasky and his agent that there are a lot of books out there with suggestions for how to fix the partisan problem, much less the governing problem. Tomasky does not hide his game-changing fourteen points until the end of the book, he outlines them at the beginning. Which is commendable, because ultimately that is what matters. He divides them into two groups:

Political Fixes:

1. End Partisan Gerrymandering
2. Bring Back At-Large Congressional Elections
3. Introduce Ranked-Choice Voting to Congressional Elections
4. Expand the House of Representatives to 500 Members
5. Eliminate the Filibuster
6. Get rid of the Electoral College (or Make it Obey the Popular Vote)
7. Revive Moderate Republicanism

Social and Cultural Fixes:

1. Establish "Foreign" Interstate College-Student Exchange Programs Between Blue and Red States
2. Reduce College to Three Years and Make Year Four a Service Year
3. Expand Student Exchange Programs to High Schools
4. Make Large National Employers Offer Similar Exchange Programs for Employees
5. Vastly Expand Civics Education
6. Insist on a Left that Doesn't Contribute to the Fracture
7. Demand that Corporate and Business Leaders Commit to Social Responsibility.

Mr. Tomasky is obviously a closet Communist!

Again, as I am sure I will find in every political science scholar's book, there is no consideration of reformulating the separation of government powers. I am the only proponent of such a theory.

Constitutional Blasphemy

Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government--and Why We Need a More Powerful Presidency

William G. Howell

Terry M. Moe

In a recent query of my own slogan, "The Constitution is junk," I encountered this title. Published in 2016. It seemed familiar, but I have no file on it in my collection of files and notes. I would have remembered the "more powerful presidency." I really want to read this, but I am out of the habit of reading books. I want to see if I can follow their line of reasoning to a "More Powerful Presidency." That seems absurd - doesn't it?

These are a couple of highly respected political science professors at big-time universities. The four blurbs are good endorsements. I recognize Sanford Levinston. I am sure I have written him once.

Howell and Moe deserve immense credit for 'connecting the dots' between our dangerously dysfunctional political system and an outmoded Constitution. One can only admire their willingness to challenge the cult of the Constitution that affects our political culture and hope their book gets widespread attention that it so richly desreves.

Two of the other blurbs suggest that their theory will "trigger" and "set the terms" for a debate. 

I have read just a little bit. The introduction and the start of the first chapter, and they take the time to ease the reader into understanding the issues that the American Founders were concerned with and how that shaped their formulation of the government back then. I learned that Montisquieu posed the bicameral legislature, which supports my unpublished theory that the Great Compromise is a half-truth. I am disappointed that they define the Senate as representative of the elite class rather than the laws of the states, which is what I believe should be the preferred intention, if it was not the intention of the Founders.

They are also claiming that the Founders intended for the judiciary to interpret and review the law, which contradicts my understanding of the outcome of the Marbury versus Madison Supreme Court ruling.

If I don't get anything else from their book, it is that this book was unable to trigger the debate after ten years.

Demarcation of Law Separation Theory

Mr. Madison will cease turning over in his grave and may finally rest in peace. 

The category mistake in the conventional description of the Three-part Separation Theory was practically adjusted by recognizing that the judicial branch is inevitably responsible for the review of the law - adjudication. Therefore, the three branches that we interpret are the processing stages for the administration of the law: legislate, execute, and adjudicate. 

Law is what converts the will of the people into government powers. 

The Demarcation of Law Separation Theory suggests that we use the sections (separated qualities) of law to define all aspects of the government, checks and balances, constituency, and civil law itself; and that there is an order that can be deployed to align these aspects. 

The powers of government are primarily separated into three sections of law: sovereignty, administrative, and civil law. Sovereignty Law defines the constituency and includes boundaries, insignia, and social constructs. Administrative law is the section of law concerned with the operations of the government entities, and is assigned to the judiciary to enforce on behalf of the people. The civil law can then be subdivided into four administrative jurisdictions: diplomacy, commercial, trust, and property law. Providing a six-part separation system for balancing a more accurate distribution and control of the powers that should meet our modern expectations for checks and balances. 

The commissioning of administrative jurisdictions of civil law, each with its own executive security department, and graduated legislatures and adjudication systems will fulfill what was prescribed by Mr. Madison in the political science scholars' favorite essay, Federalist Papers Number 51: “each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others, . . . divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action.”

The unchallenged dilemma we endure is that the bicameral legislative assemblies are not commissioned exclusive jurisdictions of law to guard (principles of action), and that incalculable aspect surrendered the entire system to flawed partisanship. The addition of the Seventeenth Amendment, making the Senate elections public (modes of election) like the House of Representatives, captured the All-American duopoly of forever-wavering political parties. The primary doctrine of the duopoly evolved into doing whatever it takes to win public elections in the persistent effort to populate the three branches in partisan alignment to overrule the competing faction, rather than guarding the commission of the branch to check the abuses in the other branches.

Legislative assemblies commissioned for specific jurisdictions of law with graduated appointment rules are inclined to faction based on the arguable aspects associated with the isolated system of law, rather than the general political parties' promises to relieve artificial grievances. The Demarcation of Law Separation model with exclusive legislative assemblies and corresponding security departments will further fulfill the ambition to provide each partition with “a will of its own,” because each partition will have robust career paths for its members compared to the whimsical career paths for the present elected offices, isolated paths in the bureaucracy, and a stagnant judiciary.

SLC: Nomenclature

The Secular Library Classification system suggests that a semantic collation pattern can be used to organize a comprehensible system for explicit knowledge, which should benefit humanity. 

SLC: General Categories

26-05-05 Reconsidering 440. State to Polity.

A few years ago, I thought "State" was the general category, but the subsequent categories I listed seemed too customized to my preference for accessing the sovereign states.

For my Scrivener list I have it replicating the government charter realms

440: State

• 441: Sovereignty
• 442: Justice
• 443: Liberty
• 444: Economics
• 445: Trust
• 446: Property

But in my computer directory, I have collation list for accessing the states, which I thought belongs in the subcategories under 441: Sovereignty of the scriv list

440: State

• 441: geographical
• 442: undefined
• 443: national
• 444: state
• 445: local
• 446: international

SLC: Subcategories

Subcategories are categories subsequent to the general categories. The subcategories are alpha-numerically coded to the right of the septenary point and are not confined to the septenary or semantic collations. 

321.#########

It is expected that at some point in the hierarchy, categories have unique systems of subcategories, and possibly different systems for the same topic in different general categories.

Property Law

Property Law is regulated by the Network of Representatives, administered by the Department of the Interior, and executed by various security agencies.

The representation should be a sophisticated, graduated, and proportional system for managing multiple economic and moral ideologies.

The federal Network of Representatives will probably accept either three or six council members from each municipality.

The state governments will sponsor the three or six offices in each municipality for the state networks, and may independently sponsor further offices, based on a proportional formula to be determined in the state's constitution for membership in the state's legislature.

The municipalities are responsible for any further sponsorship of representation in the municipal councils.